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NONESTABLISHMENT, STANDING, AND
THE SOFT CONSTITUTION
STEVEN D. SMITHt
It is not usual for legal scholars working in establishment
clause jurisprudence-and it is especially not usual for me-to
say nice things about what the Supreme Court has done to the
subject. But that is what I mean to do today. I don't want to be
too agreeable or cheerful, though, so this time, although
commending the Court, I am going to take issue with the
commentators. More specifically, I want to praise a recent
development that most commentators seem to deplore-namely,
the Court's recent practice of using the slightly disreputable
doctrine of standing as a device to avoid deciding Establishment
Clause cases on the merits.
Thus, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,' the
Court used a dubious "prudential" standing doctrine to avoid
deciding whether the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance were unconstitutional. In the recent case of Salazar v.
Buono,2 the decisive votes to reverse a decision ordering removal
of a cross from federal property in the Mojave Desert were
premised on the Plaintiffs ostensible lack of standing to seek the
particular relief ordered. Most importantly, in Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc.,' the Court turned back a
challenge to the "faith-based initiatives" program by interpreting
taxpayer standing narrowly; the decision portended a potentially
drastic narrowing of the class of plaintiffs who will have standing
' Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. A distilled
version of this Article was presented at the Religious Legal Theory Conference at St.
John's School of Law on November 5, 2010. I thank Larry Alexander, Dick Arneson,
Janet Madden, Michael Perry, and participants in a workshop at University of San
Diego, as well as participants in the St. John's conference, for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
2 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
3 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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to challenge ostensible Establishment Clause violations.
Standing is again a central issue in the pending case of Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn;5 as of the time I
write, what the Court will do with standing in the case remains
uncertain.
Commentators have criticized these recurring resorts to
standing doctrine as unprincipled, evasive, and subversive of
religious freedom.6  My own contrary judgment-namely, that
this development is to be welcomed-is not the product of any
sophisticated or innovative analysis of standing doctrine.
Rather, my judgment is the conclusion, or moral of a story, that I
need to tell in stages.
The first, preliminary chapter is not so much a narrative as a
proposed distinction between two kinds of constitutionalism,
which I will call "hard" and "soft" constitutionalism. With this
distinction in place, the story proper-told in more detail in
another paper' and distilled here-then recounts how, from the
founding through about the 1960s, debates and decisions about
the relation between government and religion were mostly a
matter of soft constitutionalism. And this was a complicated,
messy, but generally fortunate state of affairs.
In the 1960s, however, this situation changed, as the
Supreme Court elevated a construction that I will call "political
secularism" to the status of hard constitutional doctrine. Though
' For one example of the narrower approach to standing, see In re Navy
Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008), where the D.C. Circuit held that
Protestant Navy chaplains lacked standing to challenge allegedly preferential
treatment of Catholic chaplains.
5 562 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 3350 (2010).
6 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23-33 (2009); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle:
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115; Lauren S. Michaels, Recent
Development, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation: Sitting This One Out-
Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Funding, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 213 (2008); Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 94-95 (2007). But cf.
Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-
Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 655,
675 (2009) (suggesting that Hein's narrow interpretation of standing reflects "the
idea that there are, and ought to be, multiple, rival authorities" that underlies the
American commitment to religious freedom).
I Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the
School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945 (2011) [hereinafter Smith,
Constitutional Divide].
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well-intended, this elevation in effect unlearned the fundamental
lesson of disestablishment that the American experience had
taught and transformed what had been a generally healthy
contest of interpretations of the American Republic into a nastier
and more divisive conflict.
Our current so-called "culture wars" are in part a product of
this unfortunate move by the Court. Prospects for easing the
conflict do not appear bright; but if there is any solution, it will
involve shifting more of the disputes over religion out of the hard
constitutional category and back into the soft category. And the
Supreme Court's recent use of standing doctrine is hopeful
because it may reflect an effort to do just that.
That is the preview. Now for the actual story.
I. HARD AND SOFT CONSTITUTIONALISM
We should begin with the crucial distinction. Hard
constitutionalism should not pose any great difficulty: By "hard
constitutionalism" I simply refer to what we usually have in
mind when we talk about "constitutional law." Hard
constitutionalism is composed of constitutional law enforceable in
the courts. The key element is judicial enforceability.'
Marbury v. Madison' was the great victory for hard
constitutionalism: The decision insisted that the Constitution is
law-law in the same sense that statutes are law and hence
judicially enforceable in the same way statutes are. Marbury
may be responsible for a sort of prejudice in favor of hard
constitutionalism, or even for an incapacity to imagine any other
sort of constitutionalism. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall
sometimes seems to claim that if the Constitution were not hard
law, it would be a meaningless, empty sham. 0
8 Thus, the difference between "hard" and "soft" constitutionalism, as I am using
the terms here, is not equivalent to the difference between written and unwritten
constitutional commitments, or between definite and vague commitments. A
constitutional rule might be specific and concrete but nonetheless "soft" because not
judicially enforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170
(1974) (ruling that Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce accounting requirement of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 against the CIA, and acknowledging that no one else
might have standing either). Conversely, a constitutional doctrine might be highly
amorphous and only loosely tied to the constitutional text but nonetheless "hard"
because judicially enforceable: The "right to privacy" is arguably an example.
9 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
1o See id. at 176-77.
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But surely this claim overreaches. As a counterfactual
exercise, imagine that Marbury came out "the other way," as we
say-that Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that even
though, in his opinion, the 1789 Congress violated the
Constitution by conferring original jurisdiction over such cases
on the Supreme Court, there was nothing the Court could do
about this violation. More generally, suppose the Constitution
came to be viewed not as hard law enforceable in the courts, but
rather as a set of venerable precepts, prescriptions, and
prohibitions solemnly issued by "We the People," not judicially
enforceable, but intended to be understood, respected, and
followed by government officials and citizens generally. Would
this soft Constitution have been meaningless? Or, as Marshall
put it, "absurd?""
I don't think so. Though not judicially enforceable, the
Constitution still would likely work to frame discussions and
influence political decisions. Government officials or institutions
that deviated from the Constitution's prescriptions might not be
censured in the courts, but they would likely be called to account
in other forums-other branches of government and, ultimately,
in the forum of public opinion. It is even possible, as James
Bradley Thayer suggested, that these other forums would take
their responsibility of understanding and preserving the
constitutive mandates more seriously if they did not suppose this
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine
the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested,
that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that
the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is
on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then
written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to
limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.
Id.
n Id. at 177.
[Vol. 85:407410
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to be a task solely, or at least primarily, for courts. 2 And
political discourse would be quite different than it would be if no
such body of rules and instructions had been adopted, so that
there were no such materials to guide political deliberation and
every decision was straightforwardly "political" in the rawest
sense.
Consequently, assigning some or all public matters to the
domain of soft constitutionalism would be quite different than
rejecting constitutionalism altogether in favor of leaving all
public matters to ordinary politics. As an example, imagine a
proposal to proscribe pornography under the kind of statute that
Catharine MacKinnon promoted several years ago.' 3 Under our
hard Constitution, any such prohibition would surely be
challenged in court, and if the court concluded that the
prohibition violates the First Amendment the prohibition would
be invalidated as unconstitutional." Under a soft constitutional
approach, by contrast, courts would refrain from invalidating
such a law. But, the legislature considering the proposal-a
legislature composed of delegates sworn to uphold the
Constitution and answerable to the electorate for failure to abide
by this oath-would still debate the measure's consistency with
the First Amendment and would enact it only if willing at least
to say that constitutional requirements were satisfied. Such
reasoning and assertions would likely come in for public scrutiny,
including at the next election. Such a situation would be
distinctly different than one in which the pros and cons of
12 Thayer famously observed that:
[T]he exercise of Uudicial review], even when unavoidable, is always
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative
mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political
experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting
the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors.....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now
lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and
to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (Da Capo Press 1974) (1901). For
a recent attempt to apply Thayer's perspective to contemporary constitutional law,
see generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY,
AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009).
s See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Commentary, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22 (1985).
" See generally Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
2011]1 411
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pornography regulation-its costs and benefits, so to speak-
would be hashed out without reference to any generally accepted
constitutional commitment to freedom of speech.
Although not meaningless, however, a regime of soft
constitutionalism would have a different character than the hard
one we are familiar with. Different citizens and officials would
likely interpret the Constitution in different ways, and there
would be no one to tell them that they were officially and
definitively wrong. Thus, different constitutional understandings
would continue to be available, and to compete actively with each
other, as political decisions were made.
As noted, Marbury declared that our own system would
operate under hard constitutional law. But Marbury could not,
and did not, banish all soft constitutional law from our political
practice. In fact, the American political system has
had considerable experience with soft as well as hard
constitutionalism. Thus, Larry Kramer describes what he calls
the "popular constitutionalism" that Americans inherited from
the British and that characterized American constitutionalism
up to and even beyond Marbury.'6 "Constitutionalism," he
explains, referred to "a set of understandings and conventions
about rights and liberty that .. . yielded a framework for
argument rather than a fixed program of identifiable outcomes.""6
Kramer elaborates, "Eighteenth-century constitutionalism was
less concerned with quick, clear resolutions. Its notion of legality
was less rigid and more diffuse-more willing to tolerate ongoing
controversy over competing plausible interpretations of the
constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea as
unfocused as 'the people.' ""
Kramer argues that in its historical context, Marbury did not
so much eliminate this older notion of constitutionalism as assert
the judiciary's right to participate in it."' Today, he thinks, we
have largely lost the conception of popular constitutionalism. "In
our world," he observes, "there is law and there is politics, with
1 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004).
16 Id. at 30-31.
1 Id. at 30.
18 See id. at 114-27.
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nothing much in between. For us, the Constitution is a subset of
law, and law is something presumptively and primarily, even if
not exclusively, within the province of courts.""
Kramer's assertion may be mostly accurate as a description
of how people today think about constitutional law;20 but in this,
as in other respects, our practice is richer than our theorizing.2 '
A soft quality continues to inhere in some constitutional
discourse today. Thus, some constitutional provisions or
notions-the Republican Form of Government Clause is a
common example-are essentially nonjusticiable.2 2  Such
provisions remain available for purposes of evaluating and
criticizing governmental actions or institutions, but they are not
enforceable in the courts.
Similarly, some scholars describe doctrines that have what
these scholars call "subconstitutional" status.23 Other provisions
or doctrines may have a hard justiciable core surrounded by
softer penumbras: In the penumbral margins the Constitution
remains relevant, but courts would likely defer to the decisions of
other branches. These constitutional doctrines have both hard
and soft domains. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, Congress has some authority to
determine that practices that the Court has not seen fit to
condemn nonetheless violate the Constitution.24
" Id. at 24.
20 Of course, many may believe that the abandonment of popular
constitutionalism in favor of a more unified constitutionalism centering on judicial
supremacy is a welcome advance. See generally Larry Alexander & Lawrence B.
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (critically
reviewing KRAMER, supra note 15). For a forceful defense of judicial supremacy, and
hence of hard constitutional law, on the ground that settlement of constitutional
issues is imperative, see generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending
Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000).
21 See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).
22 See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1475-76 (2010) ("Indeed, for some matters, legislatures
are the only bodies to consider constitutional questions. For example, Congress has
exclusive authority to interpret some constitutional provisions, like the Republican
Form of Government Clause, the Declaration of War Clause, and the clauses
relating to impeachment.").
23 Cf Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 574-75 (2008) (discussing significance of "soft law" or
"subconstitutional law").
24 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966). However,
Congress's section 5 power to interpret the Constitution differently than the Court
has done was limited in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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In sum, our political system exhibits a mix of hard and soft
constitutionalism, as well as ordinary politics unconstrained by
constitutional restrictions, either hard or soft. Both as a
descriptive and normative matter, it is debatable how much of
our political life is, or should be, assigned to these different
domains. And the answers to those questions may change from
time to time. Thus, it would be fair to say that the Warren Court
dragged a good deal of what had previously been subject to
ordinary politics, or soft constitutionalism, into the hard
constitutional category. Subsequent courts have sometimes
preserved, or even expanded, the scope of hard constitutional
law-it was, after all, the Burger Court that decided Roe v.
Wade-but sometimes have nudged some particular matters back
into the soft constitutional or ordinary politics zones.25
II. THE SOFT SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
With these distinctions in mind, we can ask about the matter
of religious nonestablishment, or the "separation of church and
state." The label refers to a set of commitments and questions
that have often been of great public interest and concern. But
are those commitments and questions-and should they be-
within the domain of hard constitutional law, soft
constitutionalism, or ordinary politics?
A. Soft Constitutionalism and Contesting Visions
Matters of nonestablishment have always lapped into all
three categories, but the proportions and allocations have varied.
Through much of American history, separation of church and
state was mostly, but never entirely, a matter of politics guided
and constrained by soft constitutionalism.
Initially, the scope of hard constitutional law was real, but
minimal. Thus, the original Constitution adopted one very
specific constitutional prohibition-presumably one that could
have been judicially enforced-against religious tests for federal
public office. Shortly thereafter, the First Amendment
prohibited the establishment of any national religion. Justices
and scholars have fiercely debated just what this prohibition
entailed, of course, but the evidence suggests that at the time of
25 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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enactment and in the Republic's early years, the hard content of
the prohibition was understood to be relatively narrow. Thus, at
the conclusion of a careful recent study, Donald Drakeman
explains that
it is important to appreciate that [the Establishment Clause]
was not the statement of a principle of secularism, separation,
disestablishment, or anything else. It was the answer to a very
specific question: Would the new [national] government
countenance a move by the larger Protestant denominations to
join together and form a national church? The answer was
no....
At the time it was adopted, the [Establishment [C1lause
addressed one simple noncontroversial issue, and the list of
those who supported it demonstrates that it cannot reasonably
be seen as encompassing a philosophy about church and
state .... 27
Though the hard content of the nonestablishment clause was
narrowly limited, the clause together with its companion, the
Free Exercise Clause, also expressed-or at least came to be
viewed as expressing-a broader commitment to religious
freedom that emanated outward to animate and inform a much
larger and contested area of softer constitutionalism. For
example, although James Madison seems not to have publicly
opposed legislative prayer in the First Congress-he sat on the
House committee that approved the appointment of a chaplain-
and although as President he issued thanksgiving proclamations,
years later, in retirement and in private memoranda, he could
doubt the constitutionality of these measures. 28 And when the
question arose whether the Post Office should deliver mail on
Sundays, Americans hotly debated the implications of church-
state separation for this issue. The question was not one to be
27 DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 330 (2010). I
have argued for an essentially similar interpretation in Steven D. Smith, The
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843,
1843 (2006). See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE (1995)
[hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE].
28 See James Madison, Detatched Memoranda (1817), reprinted in THE SACRED
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 589-93 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009)
[hereinafter SACRED RIGHTS]. This memorandum, believed to have been written
between 1817 and 1832 and not discovered and published until much later,
advocates a strict separation of government from religion and opposes official
chaplains and executive declarations of days of fasting and thanksgiving.
2011] 415
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submitted to the courts for definitive resolution, but it was
nonetheless a question understood to sound in central
constitutional commitments.
Later in the nineteenth century, issues of prayer and Bible
reading in the public schools provoked similar debates. In some
localities these issues were submitted to state courts (which
reached different conclusions on the question) but these
questions were not understood to be susceptible of hard
constitutional answers under the national Constitution.ao
Such issues generated a variety of views about the
constitutional commitment to religious freedom, but many of
these views can be grouped under two general headings,
reflecting two major interpretations of the relation of religion to
government in the American Republic. I have elsewhere
described this contest at greater length;"' here I will only give a
summary of the situation. From the outset, and continuing to
the present day, American political history has exhibited (and
has been shaped by) a sometimes collaborative and sometimes
more conflictive contest between two major conceptions, or
families of conceptions, that can be called "ecumenical
providentialism" and "political secularism."
Depending on the prevailing demographics, providentialism
has struggled to encompass (in nondenominational fashion)
Protestants, or more broadly, Christians, or even more broadly,
Christians and Jews," or more broadly still, theists generally.
29 See DRAKEMAN, supra note 27, at 283-305. See generally Richard R. John,
Taking Sabbatarianism Seriously: The Postal System, the Sabbath, and the
Transformation ofAmerican Political Culture, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 517 (1990).
1O John Jeffries and James Ryan observe that "by the early twentieth century, a
few state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious observances in
public school as violative .of state constitutions, though most courts continued to
approve these practices." John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History
of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 304 (2001).
a See generally Smith, Constitutional Divide, supra note 7.
32 By the 1950s, Will Herberg argued most Americans had come to believe in the
conception of the three "communions"-Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism-as
three diverse, but equally legitimate, equally American, expressions of an overall
American religion, standing for essentially the same "moral ideals" and "spiritual
values." WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW 87 (1983). This "common
faith," Herberg reported, "makes no pretensions to override or supplant the
recognized religions, to which it assigns a place of great eminence and honor in the
American scheme of things." Id. at 88-89.
*3 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893-98 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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The position's core claims are that America's history and
institutions are subject to an overarching Providence,34 that
public morality and civic virtue rest on a religious foundation,
and that not only individual citizens but the nation qua nation
ought to acknowledge their dependency on Providence-but that
government can and should remain noncommital with respect to
specific creedal differences, which are not important for civic or
political purposes. The conception of ecumenical providentialism
was nicely expressed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, who famously
insisted that "[o]ur form of government has no sense unless it is
founded in a deeply felt religious faith[,] and I don't care what it
s."35
Political secularism, by contrast, insists that religion is, and
should be, a private affair. Although some secularists have been
self-consciously and aggressively hostile to religion-think of
Christopher Hitchens16 -for the most part political secularists in
this country have not opposed religion itself. On the contrary,
they have sought to respect religion and to maintain religious
freedom, and indeed have sometimes argued for political
secularism primarily on religious grounds.37  But, political
secularists maintain that religion is not something that should be
expressed or acted upon by government or its agencies and
institutions.
These competing visions have been "constitutional" in the
sense that their proponents typically understand themselves to
be expressing something about the essential character of the
American Republic or about what "constitutes" it as a political
community." In addition, proponents support their
interpretations by invoking foundational documents and
statements- from American history-documents and statements
that are "constitutional" at least in a lower case sense of the
term. Supporters of the providentialist view regularly quote the
4 For an argument asserting the pervasiveness of this theme through American
history, see STEPHEN H. WEBB, AMERICAN PROVIDENCE 29-50 (2004).
11 Paul Horwitz, Religion and American Politics: Three Views of the Cathedral,
39 U. MEM. L. REV. 973, 978 (2009) (second alteration in original).
" See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD Is NOT GREAT (2007).
17 For an excellent recent example, see DARRYL HART, A SECULAR FAITH (2006).
11 Noah Feldman observes that questions about the relation between
government and religion "go to the very heart of who we are as a nation. They raise
the central challenges of citizenship and peoplehood: who belongs here? To what
kind of nation do we belong?" NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 7 (2005).
2011]1 417
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Declaration of Independence, with its appeal to "Nature
and . . . Nature's God" and its bold assertion that men "are
endowed by their Creator with . .. Rights."39 Other favorite texts
include Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,4 0
presidential proclamations and inaugural addresses by early
luminaries such as Washington and Jefferson, 41 and Lincoln's
celebrated Second Inaugural Address: "With malice toward
none, with charity for all ... ."42 Conversely, proponents of the
secularist interpretation point to an array of evidence,43 including
the deliberate omission by the framers to include religious
3 JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 41 (1996).
'0 Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Act for Religious Freedom (Jan. 16, 1786),
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE 63-64 (J. F. Maclear ed.,
1995). Jefferson's Statute began with the declaration that "Almighty God hath
created the mind free," and that governmental coercion in matters of religion
represented "a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our religion, who being
Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as
was in his Almighty power to do." Id. at 64.
Washington's First Inaugural Address contained these words:
[I]t would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official Act, my
fervent supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the
Universe .. .. In tendering this homage to the Great Author of every public
and private good, I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not less
than my own; nor those of my fellow-citizens at large, less than either. No
People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which
conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of the United States.
Every step, by which they have advanced to the character of an
independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of
providential agency. .. . These reflections, arising out of the present crisis,
have forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be suppressed.
George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in SACRED
RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 446-47. In his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson
expressed a similar notion:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led
our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a
country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has
covered our infancy with His providence and our riper years with His
wisdom and power, and to whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications
with me ....
Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), reprinted in JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOm 206 (2001).
42 Lincoln's address, now engraved on the wall of the Lincoln Memorial, was, as
one historian observed, a "theological classic," containing within its twenty-five
sentences "fourteen references to God, many scriptural allusions, and four direct
quotations from the Bible." ELTON TRUEBLOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 135-36 (1973).
See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN AMERICAN LAW
(forthcoming) (Feb. 14, 2011 draft, ch. 3, p. 3), available at http//www.
americanbarfoundation.org/events/201.
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language in the Constitution itself,4 Jefferson's "Wall of
Separation" letter 45 and his refusal to declare a national day of
prayer and thanksgiving,46  James Madison's "Detatched
Memoranda,"4 7 and a statement in the Treaty with Tripoli.4 8
But although both conceptions are constitutional in nature,
through much of the nation's history they exhibited a soft
constitutional character. Usually they were not offered or taken
as judicially enforceable interpretations of what the national
Constitution itself formally and bindingly mandates. Thus, when
nineteenth-century courts heard cases challenging prayer and
Bible reading in the schools, they considered and then accepted
or rejected these claims as matters of state law, not federal
constitutional law.49 Judges and American citizens generally
were free to reach different conclusions: Since the judicial
decisions did not purport to be enforcing the United States
Constitution, it was possible for school prayer to be deemed
acceptable in one place and unacceptable in another place.
To be sure, there have been citizens who have wanted their
favored conceptions to be constitutionalized in a harder or more
formal sense. Opponents of the original Constitution contended
that it should have included some acknowledgment of the
Almighty, as the state constitutions did and as the Articles of
Confederation had done.50 This position was again popular in the
north during the Civil War." Conversely, other citizens favored
a more explicit constitutional affirmation of governmental
secularism.
Following the Civil War, consequently, opposing movements
agitated for constitutional amendments that would have
expressly acknowledged Christianity in the Constitution or,
" See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION 26-44 (2005); SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS 28 (2004).
46 See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 44, at 200 ("Jefferson's metaphor ... is a
powerful statement about the need for a secular state. . . ."). The letter and
associated letters and explanations are reprinted in SACRED RIGHTS, supra note 28,
at 525-29.
46 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 623 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
47 See SACRED RIGHTS, supra note 28.
4 The Treaty with Tripoli, ratified in 1797, declared that "the government of the
United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion. . .
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, art. XI, Nov. 4, 1796, 8 Stat. 154.
49 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 30.
50 For discussion, see KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 44, at 26-44.
5 See HARRY S. STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION 273, 373 (2006).
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conversely, would have explicitly affirmed that the Constitution
required governments to be secular. But these movements did
not succeed.52 Americans, it seemed, preferred to leave the
question open. They were content to govern themselves, in this
respect, under a soft constitution.
B. The Virtues of Soft Separationism
Soft constitutionalism meant that contested practices could
vary from time to time and place to place. As noted above, one
state or one school district might conduct prayer or Bible reading
exercises in its public schools; another state or school district
might reject the practice as contrary to the constitutional
commitment to separation of church and state. Especially to
those who take hard constitutionalism for granted, this situation
may appear to be chaotic, unprincipled, and intolerable. Rodney
Smith expresses a common view in condemning, as an
unacceptable "mishmash," a situation in which the relation
between government and religion can vary by time and place."
In an article that I will discuss in more detail below, Ira Lupu
and Robert Tuttle worry that a tightening up of standing
requirements might leave more Establishment Clause
adjudication in the hands of state courts. 54  "[T]he loss of a
unifying federal voice in these matters may eventually subvert
the uniformity of federal law," they warn, adding that
"[w]hatever one's view of the Establishment Clause, [the loss of
uniformity] cannot be seen as salutary for either religious
freedom or the constitutional system as a whole." 5
My own view is different. Again, I have argued extensively
for this view elsewhere56 and can only state my conclusions here,
but I think soft constitutionalism has a good deal to recommend
it. The fact is that neither providentialism nor political
secularism can claim the full credentials that a conception ideally
ought to exhibit in order to be canonized as enforceable
52 For a detailed discussion of these movements for a Christian amendment and
a secular amendment, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
289-334 (2002).
5 RODNEY K SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 187, 190 (1987).
* See infra pp. 440-44.
* Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 166.
56 See Smith, Constitutional Divide, supra note 7, at 53-56; SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 27, at 119-27; Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled
Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497 (1996).
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constitutional orthodoxy. Either view is compatible with the
original understanding of the First Amendment, I would argue,
but neither can accurately claim to have been mandated by the
enactors of the First Amendment." And neither reflects a
consensus of American opinion, past or present. Religious liberty
in the American Republic is an essentially contested concept, as
the philosophers say, and while both the providentialist and
secularist interpretations are respectable and venerable
renderings of that concept, neither can claim to be or to give the
meaning of religious freedom in America.
Moreover, religion itself has hardly been a static force in this
country; it has waxed, waned, and shifted through a complex
series of developments that historians valiantly, but somewhat
clumsily, try to capture under labels like "awakenings,"
"revivals," and "disestablishments."69  As opposed to more
Procrustean consolidations, a soft constitutionalism in which
both leading candidates remain viable competitors was adaptable
to the ever fluctuating conditions of religion and politics in this
country.
In addition, soft constitutionalism allows more space and
incentive for a broad constitutional conversation, involving not
just judges and lawyers, but government officials and citizens
generally. Under a hard regime, in which courts have the
(presumptively) final and definitive say, citizens are naturally
" Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 9 ("Both evangelicals and secularists like to
claim that our constitutional past and tradition support their approach. Both are
wrong.").
8 A standard view discerns a major revival of religion, or "Great Awakening," in
the first half of the eighteenth century, and a Second Great Awakening in the early
nineteenth century. See MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 90-113, 166-90 (1992). As noted, Will Herberg described "the
great and almost unprecedented upsurge of religiosity under way today" in the post-
World War II period. HERBERG, supra note 32, at 256; see also A Conscripted
Prophet's Guesses About the Future of Religious Liberty in America (2007), reprinted
in 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 445, 446 (2010) ("We have for some
time been in the midst of a great outpouring of evangelical religious fervor, which I
will call the Fourth Great Awakening. . . ."). But cf JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF
FAITH 165 (1990) (asserting that the Great Awakening "might better be thought of
as an interpretive fiction and as an American equivalent of the Roman Empire's
Donation of Constantine, the medieval forgery that the papacy used to justify its
subsequent claims to political authority").
9 For an interpretation indicating three "disestablishments"-the first in the
founding period, the second in the early twentieth century, and the third in the late
twentieth century-see PHILIP E. HAMMOND, RELIGION AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY
8-11, 167-77 (1992).
2011] 421
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tempted to leave constitutional questions for judicial resolution.
Conversely, if the meaning of a constitutional provision is
understood to be perpetually open and contestable, citizens have
more incentive to participate in the conversation.o
Soft constitutionalism also has another important, though
rarely noted, advantage in this area. Because under soft
constitutionalism both the providentialist and secularist visions
are subordinate to the formal Constitution, citizens who dissent
from, at least temporarily, prevailing but objectionable (to them)
policies, decisions, and government expressions informed by one
or another of these visions are able to look beyond these and to
attach their allegiance to a higher and non-offending authority
and symbol. Thus, atheists like Michael Newdow are
understandably opposed to the national motto "In God We
Trust."" But they can if they so choose look to a more
foundational political reality-the Constitution-in which this
objectionable (to them) belief is deliberately and conspicuously
not affirmed. And because that agnostic document and symbol is
accepted as the community's supreme and constitutive law, they
can take consolation in the fact that the political community
itself is not constituted by a commitment they reject.
The point can be generalized. We often talk of "majorities"
and "minorities," but such talk reflects a superficial sociology.
Scholars have noted that in this country, nearly all citizens
regard themselves as, in some senses and contexts, embattled
minorities.6 2 "America," as Will Herberg observed, "is
preeminently a land of minorities."6 3 As a result, nearly all of us
will in different times and circumstances likely find ourselves out
of harmony with the expressions and philosophies emanating
60 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
177-94 (1999).
61 Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the use of national motto on coins).
62 See generally R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICANS (1986). Cf Continuity and Changing the Threat to Religious Liberty:
The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century (1996), in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
supra note 58, 651, 688 ("[E]ach group perceives itself as a mistreated
minority....").
6 HERBERG, supra note 32, at 231 ("Since each of the three [religious]
communities recognizes itself as fitting into a tripartite scheme, each feels itself to
be a minority, even the Protestants who in actual fact constitute a large majority of
the American people. In this sense, as in so many others, America is pre-eminently a
land of minorities.").
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from governments. But we can nonetheless remind ourselves
that these expressions and philosophies are not ultimately
constitutive of the political community. Above them in the
hierarchy of legal and political authority stands the
Constitution-the Constitution that remains steadfastly and
serenely agnostic as between the providentialist and secularist
visions of the country.6"
So soft constitutionalism has its attractions. And in any
case, for more than a century and a half after the Constitution's
adoption, the nation survived and even flourished under a mostly
soft constitutionalist regime of religious freedom. Religion was
not merely a matter of ordinary politics; on the contrary, citizens
by consensus agreed that the nation was committed to religious
freedom, and they argued vociferously about what this
commitment entailed. Inevitably, not everyone was happy with
the decisions reached in different times and places. For example,
Catholics, Jews, Quakers, Unitarians, and later secularists
chafed under the generic Protestantism, perhaps euphemistically
called "nonsectarian," of the nineteenth-century public schools. 5
Sometimes these disagreements turned ugly, even violent. 6
Anti-Catholicism was pervasive in the nineteenth century (and
later, and perhaps still) and Mormons were subjected-not, it
should be said, without some provocation on their part, to violent
persecution.6 7
Even so, the religious establishments remaining from
colonial days were dismantled-without any pressure from the
Supreme Court or the hard Constitution. Religious diversity
increased, even exploded, as a variety of new religions sprang up
through importation, internal division, or home-grown creation.
And overall, the Republic supported a measure of religious
liberty and toleration on a scale probably not matched in Western
history. All of this happened under the regime of soft
constitutionalism that prevailed from the founding up until about
the 1960s.
6 To see these arguments developed at much greater length, see generally
Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (2008).
65 BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 29 (2003).
66 See JOHN T. McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 7-42 (2003).
67 See Religious Liberty and Free Exercise: Back to the Future-What 21st
Century Legal Culture Can Learn from the 19th Century's First Amendment (2000),
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 58, 703, 704-05.
1 See generally BUTLER, supra note 58.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL HARDENING: THE ELEVATION OF POLITICAL
SECULARISM
The situation changed, subtly but drastically, in the mid-
twentieth century, as the Supreme Court selected one of the
perennial contenders-namely, political secularism-and raised
it to the status of hard constitutional law. The crucial turning
point, as I have argued at length elsewhere," was not Everson v.
Board of Education," as is commonly supposed, but rather the
school prayer decisions: Engel v. Vitalen and Abington School
District v. Schempp.72 Important though it was, Everson was an
expression of one contested but relatively concrete American
political tradition-the tradition, which Everson commended, of
denying public financial assistance to churches or to "sectarian"
schools. The school prayer decisions, by contrast, were a
constitutional turning point, working to transform not only the
jurisprudence of religious freedom but constitutional discourse
generally.
The importance of the school prayer cases was not simply
that they ended prayer in the public schools. Most schools
probably did not conduct prayer exercises anyway, and, as
noted, some state courts had prohibited public school prayer
almost a century earlier under state constitutions. The Supreme
Court's school prayer decisions were transformative, rather,
because of the general doctrine they declared. The Court might
have found school prayer unconstitutional under a limited
rationale-the inherent coerciveness of the school setting, for
example 74-but in fact the Court chose to announce a much more
sweeping constitutional doctrine.
9 See Smith, Constitutional Divide, supra note 7.
7o 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
71 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
72 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
7 Bible reading was practiced in over two-thirds of schools in the east and in
over three-quarters of the schools in the south, but the numbers were drastically
lower in the midwest and west-less than twenty percent. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE
WALL OF SEPARATION 297 (1976).
7 Although this rationale is not without its problems, the Court would later use
it in declaring graduation prayer unconstitutional. See generally Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992). The rationale would seem to apply a fortiori to classroom prayer
involving younger students.
[Vol. 85:407424
THE SOFT CONSTITUTION
Actually, in the first prayer decision, Engel, this change was
mostly implicit: The Court offered only a terse explanation for its
result, citing not a single supporting precedent. But the next
year, in Schempp the Court elaborated, declaring that in order to
satisfy the demands of the Establishment Clause, a law or
practice must be "secular": It must have been adopted to serve a
"secular" purpose, and it must have a predominantly "secular"
effect. And the Court set out these requirements in the form of
what it described as a two-part "test,"76 thus leaving no doubt
that these requirements were doctrine, not dicta. A few years
later, the Court added a third requirement-of no excessive
entanglement between government and religion-and the
Schempp test became the much-cited and much-debated Lemon
test.77
The Justices who decided Engel and Schempp seem to have
been unaware of doing anything especially audacious.7 ' And
their innocence, whether genuine or feigned, is understandable.
For one thing, the term "secular" indicates a slippery and many-
sided notion. In one classical sense of the term, it had been
assumed by virtually all Americans from the founding on-and
indeed by virtually all inhabitants of western nations throughout
the course of Christendom-that governments were supposed to
be "secular." Governments, that is, were supposed to deal with
temporal matters-with the concerns of this world and this life.
For another thing, as noted, "political secularism" had been one
of the leading interpretations of the American Republic under the
soft constitutionalist regime from the beginning; what the Court
did in Schempp was simply to capitalize the "C" in Constitution,
so to speak. Moreover, it has taken time for the implications of
the Schempp test to work themselves out; indeed some of those
implications continue to be disputed.
" Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
76 See id.
" See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
" See DIERENFIELD, supra note 65, at 132 ("In a rare moment of political tone-
deafness, [Chief Justice Earl] Warren did not anticipate the fallout from the [Engel]
case."). Justice Brennan insisted that the rulings were not radical or novel, but
rather "accord[] with history and faithfully reflect[] the understanding of the
Founding Fathers." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9 For a greater development of this point see Smith, Constitutional Divide,
supra note 7.
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But if the Justices themselves failed to perceive the larger
significance of what they were doing, the general public did not.
Writing at the time, Philip Kurland observed that "[tihe
immediate reaction to Engel was violent and gross."" Bruce
Dierenfield reports that Engel provoked "the greatest outcry
against a U.S. Supreme Court decision in a century."8' At a
Conference of State Governors, every governor except New York's
Nelson Rockefeller condemned Engel and urged passage of a
constitutional amendment to overturn it.82  Lucas Powe notes
that "Engel produced more mail to the Court than any previous
case (and few write to say what a good job the justices are
doing)."83
Observers like Kurland deplored this public reaction, finding
it exaggerated and hysterical. Kurland thought that Engel, the
first prayer decision, was "important but narrow in breadth,""
and he denigrated the decision's opponents as "religious zealots"
who were akin to "racists" and John Birch Society extremists."
In retrospect, though, and whichever side one may favor on the
merits, it seems that the indignant public was more prescient
than Kurland, the constitutional scholar. That is because the
school prayer decisions, with their canonization of political
secularism as hard constitutional doctrine, were not narrow in
their implications; on the contrary, they have had far-reaching
effects, not only for Establishment Clause jurisprudence but for
constitutional law and indeed the American self-understanding
generally.
Again, I have tried to present this argument at length
elsewhere;86 here I will only offer the conclusions of that longer
analysis. Although it took years for the teachings of Engel and
Schempp to be assimilated and developed, in retrospect it is
apparent that the decisions redirected Establishment Clause
jurisprudence away from the "no aid" separationism of Everson
and in the direction of greater emphasis on governmental
8o Philip B. Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE 142, 142 (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963).
81 DIERENFIELD, supra note 65, at 72.
82 Id. at 146.
8 LucAs A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-
2008 260 (2009).
* DIERENFIELD, supra note 65, at 136.
8 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 30, at 325-26.
" See Smith, Constitutional Divide, supra note 7.
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secularity." Hence, both the increasing receptivity of courts to
governmental assistance to religious entities for secular purposes
(as in school voucher programs and faith-based initiatives, for
example) and the judicial concern to prevent government from
"endorsing" religion (in municipal Christmas displays, for
example) were foreshadowed in the school prayer decisions.
Outside the Establishment Clause domain, Schempp's decree
that government must act only for secular purposes has subtly
but powerfully operated to restrict the sorts of interests that
governments can invoke in support of challenged laws. Laws
that would popularly be understood by reference to concerns or
interests that sound "religious" (whatever that term means) have
come to be viewed as suspect88 and, in some cases, have been
invalidated. In this vein, Susan Jacoby is correct to observe that
"the split over school prayer was a precursor of the bitter division
over the 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion decision."8 And Noah
Feldman notes the connection between Establishment Clause
understandings and controversies that are not officially
Establishment Clause matters at all, including "same-sex
marriage[,] ... stem-cell research, abortion, euthanasia, and the
death penalty.""
In effect, the school prayer decisions worked to create or at
least entrench a constitutional divide with two dimensions. One
dimension is historical. The constitutionalization of political
secularism has in a complicated sense separated contemporary
public discourse from a major part of the nation's past, including
some of the more revered expressions and manifestations that
have helped to constitute the American political tradition. The
fact is that, historically, religion has figured prominently in much
political and legal discourse. Political officials, including
presidents and judges, have cited scripture and invoked
providence in their official explanations and justifications for
their actions and decisions.9' Leading jurists such as Chancellor
87 Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge
Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDozO L. REV. 1009, 1095 (2011).
1 Thus, Edward Rubin argues that laws restricting abortion or same-sex
marriage and laws prescribing abstinence-based sex education are unconstitutional
under the establishment clause. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40-47 (2005).
8 JACOBY, supra note 44, at 324.
9o FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 6.
91 See Smith, Constitutional Divide, supra note 7.
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Kent and Justice Story declared without embarrassment that
Christianity was part of the common law." As noted, the
providentialist conception was clearly and sometimes eloquently
manifest in some of the most important and revered (and
constitutive) expressions of the American creed and spirit:
Jefferson's Virginia bill, the Declaration of Independence,
Lincoln's Gettysburg "one nation, under God," and Second
Inaugural addresses."
The elevation of public secularism to constitutional status
has placed these revered expressions in an awkward and
ambiguous position. Such expressions appear to be in open
violation of the conception of government as secular. How then
to regard them? The difficulty is apparent in Justice O'Connor's
strained and unconvincing attempts to explain why the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance do not send a message
endorsing religion,9 4 and in John Rawls's similarly labored and
implausible effort to explain how Lincoln's profoundly and
pervasively theological Second Inaugural Address might be
reconciled with the secularizing constraints of what Rawls calls
"public reason."95
92 See Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. &
HIST. REV. 27, 43 (1998).1 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
94 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); cf Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty,
118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 235 (2004) ("This rationale is unconvincing both to serious
nonbelievers and to serious believers."). Steven Shiffrin observes, "I am sure that a
pledge identifying the United States as subject to divine authority is asserting the
existence and authority of the divine." Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic
Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 70 (2004). He adds that
"pretending [that this and similar expressions] are not religious is simply insulting."
Id. at 71.
95 Rawls tentatively suggested two reasons why Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address, which Rawls aptly described as offering a "prophetic (Old Testament)
interpretation of the Civil War as God's punishment for the sin [of] slavery," was
permissible. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 254 (1993). But Rawls's first
reason-that the speech had "no implications bearing on constitutional essentials or
matters of basic justice"-seems starkly implausible. Id. Slavery? The reconstitution
of the Republic? Rawls's second reason-that Lincoln's basic message "could surely
be supported firmly by the values of public reason"-even if plausible, suggests that
the speech was permissible only because similar points could have been made
without the theological content which was the essence of the speech's insight and
power. Id.
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The second kind of divide that the school prayer decisions
and the secularism requirement helped to create, or entrench, is
more cultural or sociological in nature. In embracing the
secularist conception and rejecting the providentialist conception
of America, Engel and Schempp imposed a view generally
accepted in elite culture but widely rejected in more popular
culture." Thus, John Jeffries and James Ryan observe that "the
controversy over school prayer revealed a huge gap between the
cultural elite and the rest of America. " Public and scholarly
reaction to the Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance as recited by school
children reflected a similar divide."
In one respect there is nothing new in this sort of division.
As noted above, Americans from the beginning have contended
among each other, and often within themselves, about whether
the providentialist or secularist conception better expresses the
nature of the political community. The American political
character was shaped not by either of these visions in isolation,
but rather by the ongoing conversation between them. Engel and
Schempp could not silence that conversation, but they
transformed the ongoing debate in one crucial respect: The
secularist conception was officially declared to be the
constitutional orthodoxy, embodied in hard constitutional law
and hence binding on governments, local, state, and national.
And the providentialist view was accordingly relegated to the
category of constitutional heresies.
That transformation has inevitably altered the character of
the debate. For one thing, at least when issues are discussed in a
judicial forum, as the most heated controversies usually are,
eventually, the proponents of the providential view are forced
" See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS 63-64 (1991) ("In
general, . . . the progressive alliances tend to draw popular support from among the
highly educated, professionally committed, upper middle classes, while the orthodox
alliances tend to draw from the lower middle and working classes. The association is
anything but perfect, yet it generally holds . . .
9 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 30, at 325.
98 The public reaction against the decision was, of course, swift and vehement.
Major scholars, by contrast, believe the Ninth Circuit was correct in principle, and
some worried about how to appease an uncomprehending public. See, e.g., MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 308-16 (2008). Kent Greenawalt wondered,
for example, whether this was a rare instance in which dissimulation by the
judiciary might be permissible. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 95-102 (2009).
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either to talk the language of secularism or else be ruled out of
court. Critics often and not implausibly suspect such advocates
of being disingenuous. 99 But if their translation of their concerns
into secular talk is not fully forthcoming, these advocates are
reticent under duress, because it is only by adopting a secularist
vocabulary that they are permitted to participate in the legal
conversation at all.
Believers in the providential conception, conversely, feel
beleagured and alienated. Noah Feldman observes that "[t]he
constitutional decisions marginalizing or banning religion from
public places have managed to alienate millions of people who
are also sincerely committed to an inclusive American project." 00
The sometimes bitter struggle to preserve the vestiges of that
providentialist conception-the religious expressions conveyed in
such things as the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
or the Mt. Soledad cross-seems inexplicable to some. Why do
people get so worked up about these small, almost meaningless
gestures and symbols?' 0' But the passions are understandable as
manifestations of the apprehensiveness felt by people who, as
Feldman observes, have often come to view themselves as
strangers in their own land. 102
Consequently, the dynamic of mutual suspicion and
resentment is manifest in the clashing rhetorics of what is often
called, in a description that becomes increasingly apt, the
"culture wars."0 3
In elevating political secularism to the status of hard
constitutional law, the Supreme Court effectively ignored or
forgot what is often thought to be the main lesson of
" See, e.g., Church and State in the United States: Competeing Conceptions and
Historic Changes (2006), in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 58, 399, 425, 440
[hereinafter Church and State in the United States].
10 FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 15.
101 In this vein, Richard Schragger argues that concern about governmental
religious expression "distracts from more significant Establishment Clause
concerns." Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse
of Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1810, 1880 (2004). "Government-sponsored
religious messages are literally symbolic acts, and while such acts may have effects
on the distribution of social power, they should not be considered more significant
than government actions that favor religious institutions with concrete financial or
regulatory power." Id.
102 FELDMAN, supra note 38.
10" Douglas Laycock describes the "escalating series of provocations and legal
claims from both sides." Church and State in the United States, supra note 99, at
423.
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nonestablishment in this country. It is often observed, that is,
that by allowing a diversity of religions while not establishing
any religion, the United States managed to avoid the sort of
destructive political conflicts that had so often accompanied
established religion elsewhere.' If one religion is to be
established as the officially preferred faith, then the devotees of
the various faiths will fight for that designation,'0 as they did in
the so-called Wars of Religion in early modern Europe.
Conversely, if the government refrains from designating any
religion as the official or preferred religion, then the various
faiths can rise or fall in accordance with their respective merits
and energies. That was the hope of America's "lively experiment"
in nonestablishment, at least, and the experiment seems thus far
to have succeeded. Religious pluralism has flourished; political
community has not collapsed.
By elevating one of the major competing visions of America
into hard constitutional law, however, and by thus effectively
establishing political secularism as an official and enforceable
national orthodoxy, the Supreme Court risked reviving just this
sort of destructive dynamic. And the results are apparent in the
current state of the "culture wars."
IV. SOFTENING UP THE CONSTITUTION?
So, is there any remedy for this condition-any way to undo
the unfortunate results of a set of decisions that, though well
intended, have led to a deeply divisive cultural struggle?
The prospects do not seem especially bright. To be sure, the
Court might simply try to back away from some of its
Establishment Clause decisions and doctrines. And indeed, there
is evidence that some Justices perceive the need for such a
retreat, and that they have acted in recent years to relax the
application of some doctrines. Such a retreat is discernible in the
Court's insistence in Locke v. Daveyo6 over the strenuous
objections of Justices Scalia and Thomas on allowing state
104 Cf. DIERENFIELD, supra note 65, at 11 ("In short, the Founding Fathers
created the world's first secular government as the best way to minimize the
religious tensions that had perpetually plagued Europe.").
105 Cf Religious Liberty as Liberty (1996), in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 58,
54, 70 ("If the government is allowed to take sides, the two sides wil fight to control
the government, and the government will disapprove of, discriminate against, or
suppress the losers.").
106 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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governments more "play in the joints," as the Court put it, in
deciding how to implement the separation of church and state.1 07
Similarly, a relaxation is apparent in Van Orden v. Perry where
the court upheld a Ten Commandments monument in Texas; it is
particularly apparent in Justice Breyer's omission to invoke the
"no endorsement" doctrine and his explicit, if somewhat cryptic,
contention that in hard cases there is "no test-related substitute
for the exercise of legal judgment."10 8
These developments have been harshly criticized by
commentators,o10 however-and understandably so. For judges
and scholars who understand constitutionalism mainly or
exclusively in terms of hard constitutional law, the relaxed
application of a doctrine will seem merely unprincipled, or
perhaps sneaky or cowardly, and the retreat from a particular
doctrine will seem a move in the direction of embracing or
fashioning some alternative doctrine. Hence, a shift away from
political secularism as hard constitutional law will likely be
perceived as a step toward elevating secularism's long-time
rival-ecumenical providentialism-to the status of hard
constitutional law. Justice Scalia's endorsement of monotheism
in McCreary County appeared to critics to vindicate this
perception. 1o
But to constitutionalize the providentialist interpretation
would likely be as divisive as the constitutionalization of
secularism has been, and would be as much in disregard of the
lesson of nonestablishment discussed above. The Supreme Court
will not avoid the cultural contention resulting from its
endorsement of one controversial candidate by instead endorsing
a different, but equally controversial, candidate.
A more promising strategy would be to shift more of the
constitutional law of nonestablishment back into the domain of
soft constitutionalism, where it resided through much of the
nation's history. But the prospects for such a shift seem
1'0 Id. at 718-19.
... Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
109 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden
v. Perry, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2-3 (2005); Laycock, supra note 94, at 235.
n0 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2006); Michael Newdow, Question to Justice Scalia: Does
the Establishment Clause Permit the Disregard of Devout Catholics?, 38 CAP. U. L.
REV. 409, 411-13 (2009).
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uncertain at best-particularly given the fact that so many
judges and scholars seem unable even to conceive of
constitutionalism except in terms of hard constitutional law."'
And this is where the Court's recent turn to standing seems
potentially promising.
A. The Turn to Standing
The recent turn to standing is evident in three cases. These
cases have been discussed at length in popular and scholarly
writing, but a brief rehearsal will be helpful.
1. The Pledge of Allegiance Case
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,1 2 the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's controversial Pledge
of Allegiance decision, mentioned above,"3 without actually
addressing the contentious substantive issue of whether the
words "under God" in the Pledge violate constitutional doctrine.
The majority opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens seized on the
fact that the Plaintiff, Michael Newdow, lacked custody of his
daughter, a public school student, and concluded that Newdow
had no standing to assert a claim on her behalf."
The Court's use of standing to avoid addressing the merits
was sharply criticized in a concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist,"' and the majority effectively conceded that its
application of standing doctrine was novel and "prudential," not
constitutionally compelled."' The Court's resort to standing was
widely viewed as a strategy to avoid addressing a potentially
inflammatory issue."'
n.. See supra note 19.
112 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
n See supra note 98.
n See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 1-2.
11 See id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
n1 See id. at 17-18 (majority opinion).
n1 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 821, 834-35 (2011) (asserting that the Newdow majority "engaged in an all-out
display of Bickelian 'passive virtues' by inventing patently specious 'standing'
arguments that allowed the Court to dump the case").
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2. The Faith-Based Initiatives Case
The Court's use of standing in Newdow was ad hoc and case-
specific. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,"' by
contrast, the Court interpreted standing doctrine in a way that
was likely to have wide-reaching implications.
In Hein, taxpayers challenged the use of federal funds to
support a series of conferences in which the Bush Administration
promoted so-called "faith-based initiatives"-namely, the
inclusion of religiously-affiliated service providers in federally-
funded service programs. '9 Normally, taxpayer status is not
deemed sufficient to confer standing to challenge ostensibly
unconstitutional programs and expenditures. However, the
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard Posner, 20
invoked an influential precedent, Flast v. Cohen,12 ' to permit the
taxpayers to sue for alleged violations of the Establishment
Clause.
In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court reversed.12 2 A
plurality opinion by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy, ruled that the Flast exception applies only
when Congress itself allocates public money to a religious
institution or use. 23 Since in this case it was not Congress but
rather the Executive Branch that had sponsored and paid for the
conferences out of general funds, the Flast exception did not
apply.124
Though Alito's turned out to be the controlling opinion,
however, the other six Justices all found the plurality's
distinction between congressional and executive expenditures
untenable. But they went on to draw different conclusions.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, would have eliminated
the troublesome distinction by overruling Flast and denying
taxpayer standing in both kinds of cases.2 * Conversely, Justice
n1 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
119 See id. at 595-96.
120 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006),
rev'd sub nom. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
121 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
122 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 615.
12 See id. at 608-09.
124 See id. at 609.
125 See id. at 636-37.
434 [Vol. 85:407
THE SOFT CONSTITUTION
Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, would
have interpreted Flast broadly to permit such standing in both
kinds of cases. 1 26
Though uncertain in its implications, Hein, at a minimum,
signified a severely constricted view of taxpayer standing in
Establishment Clause cases. And the Hein plurality opinion,
though adhering to a strict reading of Flast, left open the
possibility that taxpayer standing might be abandoned altogether
in an appropriate future case.'27
3. The Mojave Cross Case
In the more recent and procedurally convoluted case of
Salazar v. Buono,12 only two Justices voted to decide the case on
standing grounds, but their votes were crucial to the outcome.
The case involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a cross
that had been erected in 1934 by members of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars on federal land (the Mojave National Preserve in
California) as a memorial to soldiers who had died in World War
I.129 The Plaintiff, Frank Buono, was a retired Park Service
employee who declared that he was offended by the placement of
the cross on federal property.13 0
In an earlier phase of the case, a federal district court had
found the cross to be an unconstitutional endorsement of religion
and had ordered it removed, and after an unsuccessful appeal to
the Ninth Circuit, the federal government had not sought review
in the Supreme Court.13 ' Instead, having already designated the
cross and the surrounding property as a national memorial,
Congress passed a statute directing the Secretary of the Interior
to transfer the property to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in
exchange for other property, on the condition that the property
be maintained as a war memorial in some form.132 Buono then
moved to enjoin the transfer, arguing in the alternative that the
transfer would violate the original injunction or that the
126 See id. at 643.
127 See id. at 614-15.
128 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
129 See id. at 1811.
13 See id. at 1812.
131 See id. at 1812-13.
122 See id. at 1813.
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injunction should be modified to prohibit the transfer. The
district court granted the Plaintiffs motion, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, and the government appealed to the Supreme Court.'a
All of the Justices agreed that any challenge either to the
Plaintiffs standing to bring the original action or to the original
injunction itself was foreclosed by the government's failure to
appeal the Ninth Circuit's earlier affirmance of the injunction.134
The remaining and controlling question (in the view of seven
Justices, at least) was whether the proposed transfer of the cross
and surrounding property to a private party would violate the
original injunction. 3 5 With respect to this question, the Justices
divided: Four Justices said "yes" and three said "no. "136
The decisive votes in the case came from Justices Scalia and
Thomas. In an opinion joined by Thomas, Scalia argued that the
transfer of the property did not violate the original injunction.
On this view, Buono had in essence sought, and the district court
had given, a modification of the injunction to forbid the
transfer.3 ' But although Buono's standing to seek the original
injunction could not now be challenged, he still needed to show
standing to seek this additional relief. And since by his own
testimony Buono was offended not by the cross itself but only by
the maintenance of the cross on federal property, he could claim
no injury once the cross was in private hands.3 s But that was
exactly what Congress had tried to do-namely, situate the cross
on private property. In the absence of any injury, Scalia argued,
Buono lacked standing to seek modification of the injunction.3 1
I See id. at 1813-14.
14 See id. at 1814.
135 See id. at 1815-16.
136 Justice Aito understood the injunction to prohibit maintenance of the cross
on federal land. Transfer of the property to a private owner, he thought, was a
permissible way of conforming to that order. See id. at 1821-24. Chief Justice
Roberts appears to have agreed with this conclusion; Justice Kennedy appeared to
be similarly inclined, but favored remanding the case for further consideration by
the district court. See id. at 1821. Justice Stevens, by contrast, argued in an opinion
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor that the attempted transfer was an
unconstitutional attempt to evade the injunction. See id. at 1830-31. Justice Breyer
reached a similar result while stressing that he was merely applying the law of
injunctions and was not reaching constitutional questions. See id. at 1845.
137 See id. at 1825-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
.3. See id. at 1826-27.
13 See id. at 1826.
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The upshot of the fragmented decision was that the lower
courts' judgment was reversed and remanded for further
consideration. Only two Justices reached their conclusion on
standing grounds, but without those votes the lower court rulings
in favor of the Plaintiff would have been affirmed.
B. Evaluating the Cases
From a lay perspective, the results in these three cases may
seem disappointing and evasive, and the Court may seem to have
shirked its responsibilities. After all, controversies over money
(government funding of religiously-affiliated institutions such as
schools or social service providers) and over governmental
religious expression (as in municipal Christmas displays, the
National Prayer Day, the national motto, and so forth) have
together made up the bulk of modern concerns associated with
the "separation of church and state." The law regarding both
kinds of issues is fervently contested and notoriously murky, but
at least in theory the Court might have remedied this situation.
The Hein case, challenging the federal faith-based initatives
program, squarely raised the funding issue;140 the Newdow and
Buono cases, challenging the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance and the Mojave cross, directly presented the
expression issue.141 Hence, the cases might seem to have
presented the Court with ideal opportunities for clarifying the
law and enforcing what many regard as vital constitutional
principles.
Instead, it may seem, the Court ducked the hard questions.
Moreover, the decisions portended and invited more cases in
which forthright discussion of vital substantive concerns is
displaced by obscure and technical meanderings through the
labyrinth of "standing."
In short, to the lay eye these cases may seem to have
shunned clarification and enforcement of the Constitution in
favor of pettifoggery. This reaction is not limited to lay
observers. A similar censoriousness is apparent in scholarly
reactions to the cases.14 2 So, is the criticism warranted?
140 See supra Part IV.A.2.
141 See supra Part IV.A.1, 3.
142 See supra note 109. Some commentators criticize the cases not so much for
failing to clarify substantive establishment doctrine but instead mainly for their
failure to bring coherence to the law of standing in this area. See, e.g., Joel Fifield,
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The pointlessness of any merely technical analysis of that
question is apparent, I think, from two general propositions that
should provoke little disagreement. First, although "standing"
surely has a technical dimension that can provide ample material
for analysis and argument by those so inclined, in reality,
"standing" is a notoriously malleable or squishy doctrine that
leaves courts with a good deal of leeway either to permit or to
preclude suits by particular plaintiffs in particular contexts.143
Some observers-most notably, Alexander Bickel-have
celebrated this squishy quality of the standing doctrine as a
valuable device by which courts can practice the "passive
virtues."'" But few lawyers or scholars will doubt that, for better
or worse, the standing doctrine leaves a good deal of discretion in
the judiciary. Consequently, to criticize a particular standing
decision as if, like a student's answer to an arithmetic problem, it
could be adjudged "correct" or "incorrect" on purely technical
grounds, would be to commit a category mistake.
Second, it is generally understood that the courts' use of
standing doctrines in the Establishment Clause area has
departed drastically from usual standing rules and practices.
Two departures in particular are conspicuous and important.
The first departure involves the matter of "taxpayer standing."
Although the federal courts normally have declined to recognize
taxpayer standing, in Flast v. Cohen, as noted, the Supreme
Court made an exception that although not originally so
explained has turned out to be an exception for Establishment
Clause cases only.145 The reasoning by which the Flast majority
Recent Development, No Taxation Without Separation: The Supreme Court Passes
on an Opportunity To End Establishment Clause Exceptionalism, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 1193 (2008); Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and
the Establishment Clause, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123 (2010).
143 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) ("Standing has been called one of
'the [most] amorphous (concepts) in the entire domain of public law.' ") (quoting
Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)); ef
Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1169, 1217 (2008) ("The malleability and flexibility of the standing doctrines
are legend. They enable the federal courts to assume or to decline jurisdiction of
cases without having to confront [the] merits, except perhaps sub rosa.").
'" See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 116-27 (2d ed.
1986).
14. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 102-03. The Flast Court did not explicitly say that
taxpayer standing would be available only in establishment clause cases. Instead,
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tried to explain and justify this exception was, to put the point
charitably, highly dubious. Justice Harlan wrote a devastating
dissent in the case,146 and in subsequent cases the Justices who
have been most friendly to the Flast exception have generally not
taken its explicit logic seriously. 4 7 The result is ironic: Later
decisions that have adhered strictly to the reasoning and precise
ruling of Flast have been vulnerable to ridicule by dissenting
Justices as arbitrary, but their arbitrariness has consisted,
arguably, of scrupulously following a decision that made little
logical sense in the first place. The plurality opinion in Hein is a
conspicuous case in point.14 8  Conversely, the Justices most
enthusiastic about Flast have also been the ones to insist that
Flast cannot be taken to mean what it actually said.
The other major departure from typical standing doctrine
and practice has been the courts' acceptance, often with little or
no discussion, of what might be called "offended observer"
standing in Establishment Clause cases. In most areas of law, a
plaintiff whose only injury is that he is offended by what he
perceives to be a constitutional violation would be peremptorily
thrown out of court for lack of standing. When beginning in the
mid-1980s the Supreme Court began to regard governmental
the Court purported to permit taxpayer standing when there was a "logical link"
between taxpayer status and "the type of legislative enactment attacked"-the Court
said this link would be present only in challenges to "exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause"-and when the taxpayer relied on
"specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional
taxing and spending power...." Id. at 102-03. The meaning of this doctrine was
unclear, however, in part because the Establishment Clause is no more an explicit
limit on the spending power than other constitutional limitations are. In practice,
the Flast exception has turned out to be an Establishment Clause exception. See
Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and the
Establishment Clause, 78 Miss. L.J. 199, 211 (2008) ("This is unique, for no claim on
the merits other than one brought under the Establishment Clause has ever been
permitted in a federal court by a plaintiff asserting taxpayer standing.").
14 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 124 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The logical inadequacies
of the Court's criteria are thus a reflection of the deficiencies of its entire position.").
1 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 507-08 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even
in Flast itself, Justices who concurred in the result doubted the logic or coherence of
the doctrinal line the majority tried to draw. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring).
14 A similar development is apparent in Valley Forge Christian College, in
which the majority took Flast literally in saying that it applied only to exercises of
the spending power, while the dissent attempted to respect and apply Flast by
departing from its literal terms. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478-79, 506-09.
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endorsement of religion as a violation of the Establishment
Clause, however, it came to be supposed that the offense suffered
by observers was sufficient to confer standing. 49 Such offense, it
seemed, was precisely the injury that the "no endorsement"
doctrine was designed to prevent.so Lupu and Tuttle observe
that
[tihough judges may have become completely accustomed to
recognizing this sort of injury in religious display cases, visual
or aural exposure to a government wrong... would not
constitute an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III requirements
under any other constitutional provision. If someone visits a
courthouse and observes patently unfair trials, or blatant acts of
racial discrimination, or cruel and unusual punishments, the
viewer would not have suffered an injury within the meaning of
Article III. Standing for observers in Establishment Clause
cases is thus as exceptional as standing for taxpayers. If the
Establishment Clause context were to be removed, standing
would likely disappear. 151
To be sure, the injury inflicted by endorsement of religion
might be described in ways that could distinguish it from some of
Lupu's and Tuttle's examples. An atheist who is made to feel like
an outsider by, say, the national motto "In God We Trust" is
arguably not equivalent to a citizen who merely sees and is
offended by, say, governmental racial discrimination against
someone else. Rather, the atheist himself or herself is caused to
feel like "an outsider"-which is the injury that the "no
endorsement" test is calculated to prevent. Even so, Lupu and
Tuttle are likely right that this sort of psychic injury or injury-
by-observation would not support standing outside the
establishment area.
Because standing has been expanded in Establishment
Clause cases, it is possible to describe recent decisions (especially
Hein) either as truncating and frustrating the ability of courts to
enforce Establishment Clause norms or, conversely, as helping to
149 I discussed this aspect of the "no endorsement" test shortly after it was
announced in Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,
299-300 (1987).
160 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
151 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 158-59.
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restore Establishment Clause standing to normalcy. Neither
description does much to anchor an assessment of the recent
cases as sound or unsound.
Instead, as Lupu and Tuttle sensibly suggest, the proper
criterion for evaluation is "functionality."5 2 Nothing in the logic
or essence of "standing" (if it has an essence) dictates whether
taxpayer or offended observer standing should be permitted in
Establishment Clause cases. Either conclusion is possible within
the broad, supple scope of standing doctrine and decisions. So
the question, as various Justices have recognized, is whether
these exceptions to normal standing doctrine are desirable in
furthering the purposes or functions of the clause. 53
C. Making Space for Soft Constitutionalism?
Applying that functionalist criterion, Lupu and Tuttle argue
that the cases are unfortunate and misguided. They stress two
major and closely related problems that they believe will follow
from a contraction of standing in Establishment Clause cases.
First, a contraction in standing may shift more Establishment
Clause adjudication out of the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, and into the state courts. 154 This shift would
mean that different interpretations of nonestablishment might
come to prevail in different jurisdictions: Thus, "the dilemma of
non-uniformity looms."155
But the administration of nonestablishment by state courts
would not only be non-uniform; it would also be, in some states at
least, lax. "Many state court judges are elected, or are subject to
electoral recall, and the political unpopularity of many
Establishment Clause claims may well make state judges
reluctant to apply existing constitutional principles with vigor."5 6
Consequently, a reduction in standing might make for less
judicial enforcement of nonestablishment norms overall.
Stephen Gey puts the point more starkly.'"' Decisions like Hein,
he thinks, threaten to make structural provisions such as the
162 Id. at 153.
153 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 637
(2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
" See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 164.
15r Id. at 165.
156 Id.
157 See Gey, supra note 6.
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Establishment Clause "virtually unenforceable."'5 8
Consequently, "[tihe effect of Hein on Establishment Clause
litigation could be devastating."'
Lupu and Tuttle are careful not to overstate the case. There
is little risk, they think, that plaintiffs will lack standing to
challenge-in federal courts-actual legal coercion in religious
matters or sectarian preference by government.' And even
establishment violations that do not present these core injuries,
and hence might not support lawsuits by private parties, might
nonetheless be redressable through suits brought by "[o]ther
government officials, such as state attorneys general ... ."161 But
this sort of remedy is limited, they think, because "action by state
officials to enforce federal constitutional law is extremely rare."16 2
And the overall result of such relaxed enforceability and
enforcement would be, as Lupu and Tuttle put it, a "gap between
substance and justiciability.""'
Assuming these predictions are correct, how worried should
we be? The answer, I suggest, depends upon our judgments
about how nonestablishment concerns should be allocated as
between hard and soft constitutionalism. If we are convinced
that separation of church and state needs to be solely or
primarily a matter of hard constitutional law, then the
developments that concern Lupu and Tuttle, along with other
commentators (and some Justices) do indeed seem troublesome.
Conversely, if a shift in the direction of soft constitutionalism is
desirable in this area, as I have suggested, then what Lupu and
Tuttle describe as looming problems may come to seem like
promising possibilities.
Thus, the variations within jurisdictions foreseen by Lupu
and Tuttle appear, from the perspective of soft constitutionalism,
to be a definite advantage. Through most of American history
the largely soft constitutional regime permitted just such
" Id. at 32.
159 Id. at 30; see also Martha Nussbaum, Reply, 54 VILL. L. REV. 677, 701 (2009)
("Even though these violations may be ever so clear and ever so threatening, Hein
concludes that no citizen has standing to challenge them so long as the President
uses his discretionary funds. This seems to me a result that is unacceptable for the
future of our nation.").
16' See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 135.
161 Id. at 155.
162 Id.
16' Id. at 120.
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variations; that situation was, I have argued, generally healthy.
And indeed, lately a number of scholars (including, perhaps
ironically, Lupu and Tuttle) have begun to notice the virtues of a
more flexible approach to religious freedom responsive to both
state and local concerns and conditions.'64
Moreover, the transfer of nonestablishment concerns to
institutions other than the judiciary, and to "the people," will
from this perspective be something to applaud, not to lament.
The transfer would of course not be total. As noted above, Lupu
and Tuttle acknowledge that standing would remain to challenge
what might well be regarded as the core nonestablishment
concerns: religious coercion and sect preference.' Possibilities
would also persist for adjudication of other kinds of concerns:
Lupu and Tuttle mention suits brought by state attorneys
general, and other possibilities would likely exist as well.16 6 To
be sure, a contraction of standing doctrines might make such
adjudication less common, thus leading to something of a "gap
between substance and justiciability," as they aptly put it.'67 It is
precisely in that gap, however, that soft constitutionalism may
find the space to flourish.
Like most constitutional scholars, Lupu and Tuttle seem
scarcely to contemplate the possibility, much less the possible
virtues, of a soft constitution. For them, hard, judicially-
enforceable constitutional law and ordinary politics seem to
exhaust the possibilities. Hence, they are inclined to equate a
reduction in justiciability with a revision of constitutional
doctrine itself.' In this vein, Lupu and Tuttle maintain that
14 See generally, Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56
EMORY L.J. 19 (2006); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring
Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005). See also Richard C.
Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1888-89 (2004).
165 See supra note 159.
1" For example, it is possible that Congress could authorize suits by private
parties to adjudicate classes of nonestablishment issues. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) (allowing state to sue EPA under federal statute authorizing
such suits). Calvin Massey suggests that "[tihe most persuasive understanding of
EPA is that it permits states, as parens patriae, to assert generalized claims of
injury suffered in common by all of its citizens that wbuld not be judicially
cognizable if asserted by any individual citizen." Calvin Massey, State Standing
After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 252 (2009).
167 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 120.
"s See id. at 138 ("Eventually, the substance of the Clause may be understood as
no broader than the norms ofjusticiability under the Clause . . . .").
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although some constitutional doctrines may be in need of
revision, such revisions should be accomplished directly, not
through adjustments of standing doctrine. "If the judiciary . .. is
going to dismantle the current structure of non-Establishment
law, it should do so straightforwardly, and not by stealthy
attacks along the front of justiciability."'69
Perhaps. Given a strong commitment to hard constitutional
law, this suggestion makes sense. From the perspective of soft
constitutionalism, conversely, the suggestion seems misguided-
indeed, almost exactly wrong. The advantage of contracting
justiciability, rather, is precisely that it moves a range of
controversies out of domain of judicial finality without
renouncing substantive commitments, doctrines, or principles.
Thus, if there is any possibility of shifting separationism back
toward the domain of soft constitutionalism, adjusting standing
may be the best means of accomplishing that shift.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that recent nonestablishment decisions that
have relied on standing instead of addressing the merits need not
be viewed as evasive, "stealthy," or irresponsible. These
decisions may reflect a laudable attempt to move
nonestablishment concerns back into the realm of soft
constitutionalism, where they were through most of the nation's
history up until the 1960s. Viewed in this way, the decisions
deserve praise, not scorn. If the hardening of constitutional
establishment law has turned out to be a source of worrisome
cultural conflict, softening may be the most promising strategy
for turning down the conflict. The recent standing cases suggest
an inclination to embrace that strategy.
It is possible, to be sure, that the modern domination of the
judiciary over constitutional law has so stifled the American
political and legal imagination, and sense of responsibility, that
soft constitutionalism is no longer a viable possibility. Perhaps
non-judicial officials, and citizens generally, can no longer be
induced to take constitutional concerns and obligations seriously.
Perhaps the decline in constitutional self-governance, or the
"deaden[ing of the] sense of moral responsibility" that James
Bradley Thayer feared as a consequence of active judicial
169 Id. at 167.
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review,1 70 has already progressed beyond the point of no return.
Still, it is not obvious that such pessimism is justified. And given
the intensifying cultural conflict that the hardening of
constitutional separationism has helped to produce, an effort to
soften up the Constitution in this area seems worth attempting.
170 THAYER, supra note 12, at 107.
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